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Abstract
Fertility decline in human populations is an inherent evolutionary puzzle with major demographic, socio-cultural and evolutionary consequences. The individual level predictors of fertility decline are numerous, but the way these effects vary by
country and how they are causally mediated by other factors has received relatively little attention. Here we take a multilevel approach to compare similarities and differences in the primary predictors of contemporary fertility declines—wealth
and education—across 45 countries in Africa, Asia, Central and South America, the Caribbean, and the Middle East using
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data collected from 2003 to 2015. We use multilevel models to understand variation
in the slopes of these predictors on fertility, and structural equation models to examine the causal pathways by which they
take their effects, focusing on four mediating variables: local mortality and birth rates, women’s work status, and contraceptive use. We find that associations between wealth and fertility differ substantially across populations, while associations
between education and fertility are consistently negative. The mediators also vary: community-level birth rates and women’s
contraceptive use are important mediators between education, wealth and the number of children born across a wide variety
of countries, but community-level mortality rates and women’s work status are not. We discuss our results in the context of
different causal pathways that reflect cultural and biological evolutionary dynamics as simultaneous and interacting drivers
of fertility decline.
Keywords Demographic transition · Demographic and health surveys · Education · Evolutionary demography

Introduction
One of the biggest puzzles in human evolutionary demography is the dramatic reduction in fertility that has occurred
during the demographic transition. Fertility decline began
in late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century France and
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has occurred (or is underway) throughout the rest of the
world (Knodel and van de Walle 1979; Chesnais 1992).
Given that evolutionary theory predicts that organisms
should maximize their reproductive success, why are people
curtailing their fertility to such a dramatic degree (Vining
1986; Kaplan 1996; Borgerhoff Mulder 1998; Mace 2014;
Colleran 2016)?
There is a fairly clear negative relationship between
wealth and fertility rates across countries (Myrskylä et al.
2009; Lutz and Samir 2011). Judging by population level
measures including gross domestic product (GDP) and
human development index (HDI), wealthier countries,
broadly speaking, have lower fertility (Myrskylä et al. 2009).
It is often assumed that this pattern of high wealth and low
fertility is replicated within countries. And while in Western populations, wealthier and higher status people (particularly women) tend to have relatively lower fertility (Vining
1986; Kaplan et al. 2002), there is clear evidence that this
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is not always the case (Clark and Hamilton 2007; Dribe and
Scalone 2014).
Evolutionary demographers study variation in fertility
decline to understand how and why people choose lower
than optimal fertility in modern contexts. The field has long
been interested in the reasons why wealth has a positive
association with fertility in most small-scaled and lessmarket-integrated populations but a negative relationship
in large scale market based ones (Kaplan 1996; Mace 1998;
Hill and Reeve 2005). This puzzle arises because like all
animals, humans are assumed to have translated increased
resources into increased reproductive output for most of
their history. Within most small-scale subsistence economies, wealthier people tend to have higher fertility. Where
wealth comes primarily in the form of food energy, there is
a strong association between wealth and reproductive physiology: those with more wealth have shorter birth intervals,
greater reproductive success, and improved child survivorship (Kaplan et al. 2002). Where wealth is accumulated
through goods, objects, and materials (sometimes described
as ‘extra-somatic wealth’), this wealth (particularly for men)
is often associated with greater reproductive output (Chagnon 1979; Flinn 1986; Cronk 1991; Borgerhoff Mulder and
Beheim 2011).
The reasons for a ‘switch’ in the direction of wealth-fertility relationships are still unclear: how do reproductive incentives change as populations become more market oriented
and integrated? And to what extent are these differentially
aligned with economic considerations and changing cultural
values about reproduction (Kirk 1996; Borgerhoff Mulder
1998; Shenk et al. 2013; Colleran 2016)?
Low-fertility strategies apparently depend on fundamental changes in the prevailing economic system in the course
of the subsistence transitions that accompany market integration and economic development, including changes in the
types of wealth and status that matter for socio-economic
success as well as levels of inequality (Colleran et al. 2014;
Shenk et al. 2016), change in inheritance and migration
patterns (Colleran 2014), social networks (Madhavan et al.
2003; Colleran et al. 2014) and kin interactions (Newson
et al. 2005; Mace and Colleran 2009; Colleran and Mace
2015). But the mechanisms driving the change and the extent
to which cultural and economic patterns coevolve in the
process remains a major source of contention (Borgerhoff
Mulder 1998; Shenk et al. 2013; Snopkowski and Kaplan
2014; Colleran 2016; Stulp and Barrett 2016). Certainly,
wealth-generating and wealth-valuing systems differ across
subsistence types and cultures. This means that the very
meaning of wealth, its uses, economic relevance, cultural
value, and the expectations about how it is appropriately
used differ depending on a wide range of factors that may
be poorly approximated by the measures designed to capture

13

Population Ecology (2018) 60:155–169

economic development across cultures (e.g., Human Development Index, Gross Domestic Product).
The negative relationship that emerges in the course of
demographic transition defies a straightforward evolutionary
explanation of reproductive decision-making as the outcome
of a fitness-maximizing psychology (Perussé 1993; Borgerhoff Mulder 1998; Low et al. 2002; Alvergne and Lummaa
2014; Colleran 2016). Previous work has clearly shown that
individuals who have more children in one generation tend
to have more descendants in subsequent generations (Kaplan
et al. 1995; Mueller 2001; Goodman et al. 2012). Contemporary high-investing, low-fertility reproductive strategies
do not appear to maximize reproductive success over any
time span that has yet been studied (Kaplan et al. 1995;
Low et al. 2002; Goodman et al. 2012). Yet, despite widespread interest in the factors that may alter the direction of
the relationship between wealth and fertility, little research
has examined this question cross-culturally as opposed to
examining variation at the regional or community level
(Low and Clarke 1991; Alvergne and Lummaa 2014; Colleran et al. 2015). An important cross-cultural contribution
by Skirbekk (2008) examined broad fertility-status trends
over a large array of populations through time, covering a
time span of over 700 years. This impressive study was able
to show that there is a switch in fertility differentials between
high and low status individuals over time (as measured by
social class or occupational status): high status individuals switch from having relatively higher fertility to having
relatively lower fertility. This work grouped together both
educational and income/wealth measures as a general proxy
for status. The overall negative relationship between status
and fertility was mainly driven by education differentials,
which have had more consistent negative associations with
fertility than either wealth or income for as long as education
has been available (Skirbekk 2008). Collapsing wealth and
status into a single parameter is an important limitation from
the perspective of evolutionary behavioural scientists, who
often conceptualise wealth and status as different parameters (Hopcroft 2006; von Rueden et al. 2008; Huber et al.
2010; Bowles et al. 2010; Borgerhoff Mulder and Beheim
2011; Colleran et al. 2015), broadly construing wealth as
‘resources’ and status as ‘access to resources’. Moreover,
while it is often argued that wealth is a multidimensional
construct (Braveman et al. 2005; von Rueden et al. 2008;
Colleran et al. 2015) with a great deal more uncertainty in
its measurement and effects on fertility than for education [in
particular women’s education (Lutz and Samir 2011; Lutz
and Skirbekk 2013)], in fact education is also multidimensional in its effects (Basu 2002; Colleran et al. 2014; Snopkowski and Kaplan 2014). Among other things, education
can be considered to confer social and economic status, to
represent a body of knowledge altering women’s ability to
control both reproduction and mortality (Bicego and Boerma
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1993; Glewwe 1999; Pena et al. 2000), or to proxy access to
economic and social opportunities and information. Consequently, it is increasingly debatable whether the association
between education and fertility is directly causal or mediated
by other factors (Lutz and Skirbekk 2013; Snopkowski et al.
2016; Tropf and Mandemakers 2017).
In this paper we use multilevel models to understand variation in the slopes of these predictors on fertility, and structural equation models to examine the likely causal pathways
by which they take their effects. While we cannot match the
scope of the data presented in Skirbekk (2008), we address
important limitations of this previous work; (1) a consistent, standardised measure of wealth that can be directly
compared across populations; (2) use of covariates allowing statistical ‘control’ of other well-established predictors
of fertility decline; (3) an explicit multilevel approach that
captures the cross-cultural structure in the data and which
can handle varying relationships between wealth, education
and fertility by population; (4) use of a structural equation
model to identify the mediators of education and wealth
on fertility, and (5) an assessment of whether these possible mediators are cross-culturally consistent. Our analysis
therefore combines the strength of multilevel varying slope
models with structural equation models enabling us to see
the path-dependence of these overall effects.
We treat wealth and education as separate conceptual elements in the process of fertility decline, which has important analytical implications. In previous work, we have
argued that educational status is likely to influence whether
increased wealth is translated into higher or lower fertility
(Colleran et al. 2015). In other words, education is claimed
to causally determine the effect of wealth on reproductive
output (without, of course, being mutually exclusive, since
there will always be feedback between them). Increasingly,
educational effects on fertility are argued to be a proxy for
broader contextual, cultural or familial effects (Colleran et al.
2014; Tropf and Mandemakers 2017) which further supports
the distinction we advocate. It also means that we must do
more to understand the proximate mechanisms by which
education and wealth achieve their effects on fertility, to get
a closer approximation of the underlying causal structure
of fertility decline (Snopkowski et al. 2016). Earlier work
has used standard regression techniques to examine intercorrelations between different predictors of fertility (Martin and Juarez 1995); our approach uses structural equation
modelling to more explicitly examine the various pathways
by which education and wealth may influence fertility in different contexts. In previous work, we found that the effects
of wealth and education differed substantially between 22
different communities of a small-scale farming population
in rural Poland (Colleran et al. 2015). We also examined the
path-dependence of educational effects on fertility in three
different populations for which comparable anthropological
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data were available (Snopkowski and Kaplan 2014; Snopkowski et al. 2016). We found that education influenced fertility outcomes (both age at first birth and number of births)
via several different pathways—although these paths varied by population. For example, education was associated
with reductions in fertility via increases in women’s labour
force participation in Poland, but employment did not have
this mediating effect in Matlab, Bangladesh and San Borja,
Bolivia. Here, we extend these approaches across 45 countries in Africa, South and Southeast Asia, Central and South
America, the Caribbean, and the Middle East.
We examine four likely mediators of educational and
wealth effects on fertility at both the community and individual level: child mortality and birth rates in a woman’s
local community, women’s labour force participation, and
women’s contraceptive use. While there are other variables that might have explanatory value in our models,
we selected these variables because they are associated
with clear directional hypotheses, were available across
our surveys and allowed us to minimize exclusion of subjects due to missing information. For instance, if we had
included information related to the husband, we would
have to exclude single, divorced, and widowed women.
There are several ways that each of our candidate
mediators may channel how wealth and education are
associated with fertility. First, purely biologically, child
mortality terminates breastfeeding and increases the ‘risk’
that another child will be conceived, increasing fertility
rates when infant mortality is high and thus potentially
exacerbating mortality rates too. Second, parents may
‘replace’ children who die in line with their own or a
locally desired family size and/or as ‘insurance’ against
the possibility of future child deaths or support in older
age, again more common in areas with high child mortality
(Palloni and Rafalimanana 1999). These ‘risks’ and incentives, which may largely result from exogenous factors
affecting mortality, could alter the payoffs to translating
wealth or educational status into children. Interestingly,
while reduced child mortality is usually observed prior
to fertility declines (Mason 1997) and is widely assumed
to be an essential prerequisite to fertility change (Doepke
2005; Dyson 2010), empirical evidence actually suggests
that the effect of changing child mortality rates on fertility
is relatively small (Palloni and Rafalimanana 1999). Local
fertility rates in turn can influence women’s reproductive
output by providing information about locally appropriate
reproductive behaviour including the conditions for reproduction, and/or incentives to, or constraints on, higher or
lower fertility through social transmission. The cultural
transmission of ideas, norms, and information is of course
also influential in one’s fertility decision-making (Cleland
and Wilson 1987; Colleran 2016), especially since individuals may look to others in their local networks and
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communities to determine appropriate reproductive strategies (Behrman and Watkins 2001; Behrman et al. 2002;
Alvergne et al. 2011; Colleran et al. 2014; Snopkowski and
Kaplan 2014; Colleran and Mace 2015).
Women’s labour force participation may mediate how
wealth or education influences fertility outcomes by creating
time-constraints on childbearing such that working women
are less likely to have additional children (Ermisch 1989;
Hoem and Hoem 1989) or through increasing women’s
decision-making autonomy, which may reveal underlying
preferences for lower fertility (Dyson and Moore 1983; but
see Moya et al. 2016). Contraceptive use is another possible
mediator we examine in our models because its relationship with both wealth and education has been the subject
of much research (Ainsworth et al. 1996; McNay et al.
2003; Cleland et al. 2006; Bongaarts 2008). While education likely improves information about contraceptives and
wealth appears to increase access to them (Mace and Colleran 2009; Alvergne et al. 2011), previous research in highfertility contexts has found a positive relationship between
contraceptive use and fertility, especially in sub-Saharan
Africa, where women who have had many children and want
to end their reproductive careers or space future births are
often the ones most likely to use contraceptives (Caldwell
and Caldwell 1987; Bledsoe et al. 1994; Mace and Colleran
2009; Alvergne et al. 2013).

Fig. 1  Map of countries included in analysis. Darker colours represent higher TFR’s at the time of the most recent survey. Stars represent countries where multiple waves of data were collected, while
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Methods
We use available data from the standard demographic and
health surveys (DHS) that met the following criteria: (1)
the country was experiencing fertility decline at the time
the survey was conducted (assessed through examining
total fertility rates (TFR) the year before and after the survey from https://ourworldind ata.org/fertility), (2) the survey
was collected using the questionnaire recode IV through VII
(earlier surveys did not include the wealth index score we
use), and (3) the survey results are publically available. DHS
surveys are only carried out in less-developed countries or
countries receiving US foreign aid. Countries are surveyed
repeatedly, and we examine all applicable survey waves for
each country (http://www.dhsprogram.com/). Thirty-six of
our sampled countries had multiple waves of data (ranging
from two to four waves), generating a total of 85 survey
waves that included the necessary variables. The maximum
number of waves within a country is four (Bangladesh) but
the most common number is two. Given that we compare
across countries and within-countries, we have two datasets: (1) a sample of 45 countries with one wave of data
per country [the most recent survey completed; n = 803,426;
see Table S1 in Electronic Supplementary Material (ESM)]
and (2) a sample of 85 survey waves in 36 countries that
include countries with at least two cross-sectional waves in
two different years (Table S2 in ESM). Figure 1 displays the
sampled countries colour coded by total fertility rate (TFR)
at the time of the most recent survey and an indication of

triangles represent countries surveyed once. Mapping publishing platform credit to: Harvard WorldMap http://worldmap.harvard.edu
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whether the country contributed multiple waves of data. The
surveys were collected between 2003 and 2015 and range
in total fertility rates (at the time of the survey) from 2.15
(Bangladesh in 2015) to 7.6 (Niger in 2006). Women aged
15–49 were interviewed about their reproductive and marital
histories. In 41 countries, women were interviewed regardless of marital status, while in four countries (Egypt, Jordan,
the Maldives, and Pakistan) only ever-married women were
included (along with Indonesia’s 2007 wave). We include all
women for whom the necessary data were available in our
analyses, to capture reproduction outside as well as inside
marriage. We therefore do not restrict our analyses to married women only.
We use the measures of wealth and education created by
the DHS. The DHS wealth index is a composite measure of
household wealth including information on: the household’s
water supply, sanitation facilities, floor type; whether the
household has electricity, a domestic servant, owns agricultural land, a television, a vehicle (and type); and the number of people per sleeping room. The index is constructed
using Principal Component Analysis (Rutstein and Johnson
2004) and details for each survey can be found here: http://
www.dhsprogram.com/topics/wealth-index/Wealth-Index
-Constr uction.cfm. Education is defined as the education
of the woman in single years and varies from an average
of 1.8 years in Burkina-Faso to 10.9 years in Jordan. We
standardised these measures of wealth and education within
countries to have a mean of 0 and SD of approximately 1
(in the majority of countries the wealth index was already
standardised). This allows us to directly compare the predicted effect of a 1 SD increase in wealth and education
on fertility across different countries, while allowing wealth
and education to have country-specific meanings. Standardising within country (i.e., group-mean centring) means that
we measure wealth and education relative to the country
of the individual, not on an absolute scale across all countries. It also means that computational models are more
likely to converge. For comparison we also ran our analysis using untransformed versions of these variables across
the 45 countries. We ran all our analyses on two different
dependent variables: “number of births” and “number of
living children”, which we use as measures of ‘fertility’. Our
results do not differ substantially by outcome variable. We
therefore report only models using the number of live births
as the dependent variable. This measures the total number
of children ever born and includes children who were born
alive but later died but excludes pregnancies that resulted in
a miscarriage, abortion or stillbirth. Full details for both outcomes are reported in the supplementary materials (Tables
S3–S10). We also report our results based on standardised
variables. Again, full details of the unstandardised models
are available in the supplementary materials (Tables S5, S6,
S9, S10).
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Our analysis involves multilevel and standard Poisson
regression and structural equation modelling (SEM) techniques, which respectively take care of the non-independence of individuals within countries and the mediators of the
relationships between wealth, education and fertility. The
multilevel analysis replicates the analysis strategy described
in Colleran et al. (2015). Here we explicitly compare the
varying effects of wealth and education on fertility across
the subsample of 45 countries with one wave each. We then
assess whether there is variation between different survey
waves within those 36 countries that had multiple waves
of data, using standard (i.e., not multilevel) Poisson regression techniques. In other words, we ran a separate Poisson
regression model for each wave of data (85 waves from 36
different countries). All regression models control for age
and age2, work status, contraceptive use, and community
level mortality and fertility rates. All data handling and multilevel analysis was carried out in R v.3.12 (R Core Team
2014) using the ‘lme4’ (Bates et al. 2012), ‘blme’ (Dorie
2013) and ‘languageR’ (Baayen 2011) packages. ‘lme4’ has
known convergence issues with large datasets (Bates et al.
2012) so we follow the developers’ guidelines on scaling and
standardising variables as well as using a range of optimisers
to aid and assess convergence.
We then develop comparative SEMs across all 45 countries using the maximum likelihood with missing values
method in STATA (v. 13), using a similar analysis strategy
as found in Snopkowski et al. (2016). All SEM models test
a model where education and wealth independently predict
community-level mortality and fertility, women’s work status, and contraceptive use, which in turn, influence number
of live births. Age is included as a predictor of all individuallevel variables. Wealth and education also have direct paths
to the number of live births to determine the direct effect
of these variables after controlling for likely mediators. A
visual representation of this structural equation model (also

Fig. 2  The hypothesised structural equation model used to analyse
the mediating pathways from both education and wealth to the number of births
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known as a path model) can be seen in Fig. 2. While we present these models as a series of directed paths, SEM cannot
demonstrate causality and all results should be interpreted
as correlations.
Community-level variables are calculated at the cluster
level; the smallest geographical survey unit for DHS surveys.
Clusters consist of a number of adjacent households in a
geographical area. In urban areas, this may be a city block,
while in rural areas this may be a village, a part of a village,
or a group of small villages (ICF International 2012). Community-level mortality is defined as the number of children
who died divided by the number of live births of surveyed
women (aged 15–49) within the cluster. Community-level
fertility is defined as the average birth residual controlling
for age within the cluster, calculated by fitting a linear model
of number of births by age for each country, calculating the
residual for each woman and taking the average residual for
all surveyed women per cluster. Communities with higher
average residuals have higher fertility (controlling for age)
than the overall average for their country. Women’s work
status is an ordinal variable measured as no work in the
past year (represented by 0), works occasionally (1), works
seasonally (2), and works all year (3). In the SEMs, we treat
this variable as continuous and interpret it as analogous to
the intensiveness of a woman’s labour-force participation.
Finally, contraceptive use is an ordinal variable in the multilevel models measured as no contraceptive use (0), traditional method of contraceptive use (1), and modern method
of contraceptive use (2). In the SEMs this was included as a
binary variable (no method versus any method).

a

b

Fig. 3  Varying slopes of a wealth and b education on fertility across
the 45 countries represented by the DHS data. Plots show the marginal (model-adjusted) regression slope of each variable in each
country as produced by the multilevel models, with different countries represented by coloured lines. The black dashed lines show the
predicted averaged or ‘fixed’ effect, i.e., the association between
wealth or education and fertility when the slopes are not allowed to
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Results
The association between wealth and fertility varies
greatly by country, but education’s relationship
with fertility is consistently negative
We find that the association between wealth and fertility
varies qualitatively as well as quantitatively by country
(Fig. 3a), but the association between education and fertility
is universally negative (Fig. 3b). A 1 SD increase in wealth,
relative to other people in the country, is associated with a
range of reproductive outcomes, from a 12% decrease in
fertility in the Philippines [eβ = 0.88, β = −0.13, 95% CI(β)
(− 0.12, − 0.14)], β, regression coefficient, CI, confidence
interval, (see Table S3 in ESM) to a 3% increase in fertility
in Niger [eβ = 1.03, β = 0.03, 95% CI(β) (0.04, 0.01)], though
flatter slopes in many countries indicate that the relationship
is not always strong. These values must be understood in the
context of the range of standard deviations in a particular
country (see Tables S3 and S4 in ESM): these coefficients
translate into widely varying outcomes across countries.
For education the relationships are less varied. A 1 SD
increase in education, relative to other people in the country,
is associated with a 27% decrease in fertility in Comoros
[eβ = 0.73, β = − 0.31, 95% CI(β) (− 0.29, − 0.34)] to a 4%
decrease in fertility in Egypt [ eβ = 0.96, β = − 0.04, 95%
CI(β) (− 0.03, − 0.05), see Table S4 in ESM]. The results
are qualitatively comparable when we use unstandardised
variables, i.e., treating a 1-year increment in schooling as
the unit of measurement instead of 1 SD (Tables S5 and S6
in ESM). So a 1-year increase in schooling is associated

c

vary. Note that the variables are centred on zero, which represents
the mean value of wealth or education within a particular country. A
one-unit interval on the x-axis represents a standard deviation in the
predictor variable. c Interaction between wealth and education. Here
each line represents the relationship between wealth and fertility for
a particular point on the scale of education. The numbers attached to
each line represent the exact point on the scale of relative education
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with a 29% decrease in fertility among women living in
the Comoros, where years of schooling range from 0 to 20,
whereas a 1-year increase in schooling is associated with a
4% decrease in fertility in Egypt, which is comparable to
the estimate from the standardised model, where the range
of education is 0–23 years.
We argued that the education level of an individual
could alter how wealth influences fertility. In support of this
hypothesis, we find a significant interaction overall between
wealth and education (Fig. 3c), suggesting that these two
variables should not be understood in isolation from each
other when considering fertility differentials. For every 1
SD increase in education, the association between wealth
and fertility is on average 3% more negative [eβ = 0.97,
β = − 0.029, 95% CI(β) (− 0.027, − 0.03)]. Taking the quintiles displayed in Fig. 3c as an example, this interaction
implies that among women with the highest levels of education, more wealth is translated into fewer children. The
opposite is the case for women with the lowest levels of
education: more wealth is translated into more children.

Wealth has a more positive effect in high fertility
regimes
Figure 4a shows that in countries with high total fertility
rates, the relationship between wealth and fertility within a
country tends to be positive, other things equal, whereas in
countries with relatively low TFRs, the relationship between
wealth and fertility is more negative. This variation probably represents points on a continuum of economic development but also socio-cultural variation that regulates the
overall way that wealth is associated with fertility. Notably,
a

Fig. 4  Varying beta coefficients (± SE) of a wealth and b education
on fertility, shown in order of contemporary total fertility rates and
colour-coded to represent different macro-regions. Note that the sign
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although countries located in sub-Saharan Africa are clustered together at the higher end of the distribution of TFR,
there is also very clear variation between these countries in
how wealth is associated with fertility. In contrast, the relationship between education and fertility, shown in Fig. 4b,
is more consistent across countries, in most cases having a
small negative association. These results are consistent with
those found by Skirbekk (2008). The interaction between
wealth and education does not itself appear to vary substantially by country.

Within‑countries, the effects vary over time,
but not consistently
Our Poisson regression analyses of each wave of data within
the 36 countries for which multiple waves were available
indicate little variation in the magnitude of the associations
between wealth, education and fertility in different survey
years, though the patterns are not consistent across countries. In some countries, for example Ghana (3 waves), the
association between education and fertility is more negative
in later survey years than it is in earlier ones, indicating
somewhat steeper negative slopes of wealth and education on fertility as the overall fertility rate declines. A 1 SD
increase in education was associated with a 9% [ eβ = 0.91,
β = − 0.09, 95% CI(β) (− 0.11, − 0.07)] decrease in fertility in 2003 when the TFR was 4.51, a 14% [eβ = 0.86,
β = − 0.15, 95% CI(β) (− 0.17, − 0.13)] decrease in 2008
when the TFR was 4.19 and a 13% [ eβ = 0.87, β = − 0.14,
95% CI(β) (− 0.16,− 0.13)] decrease in 2014 when the TFR
was 3.79. The corresponding measures for wealth, which
do not vary substantially across years, are a 7% [ eβ = 0.93,
b

of the beta coefficients for the correlation between wealth and fertility
spans both positive and negative values, whereas the corresponding
beta coefficients for education are always negative
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β = − 0.07, 95% CI(β) (− 0.10, − 0.04)] decrease in fertility in 2003, a 3% [ eβ = 0.97, β = − 0.03, 95% CI(β) (− 0.06,
− 0.01)] decrease in 2008 and a 6% [ eβ = 0.94, β = − 0.06,
95% CI(β) (− 0.08, − 0.04)] decrease in 2014. These results
are comparable when using number of living children as the
outcome of interest (see Figs. S3 and S4 in ESM).
In other countries, such as Bangladesh [which has the
most (four) waves of data], the estimated slopes are comparable in different years, indicating very modest changes
over time. There, a 1 SD increase in wealth was associated
with a 1% [eβ = 0.99, β = − 0.01, 95% CI(β) (− 0.02, 0.00)]
decrease in fertility in 2004 when the TFR was 2.7, a 3%
[eβ = 0.97, β = − 0.03, 95% CI(β) (− 0.05, − 0.02)] decrease
in 2007 when the TFR was 2.44, a 1% [ eβ = 0.99, β = − 0.01,
95% CI(β) (− 0.02, 0.00)] decrease in 2011 when the TFR
was 2.24 and a 2% [eβ = 0.98, β = − 0.02, 95% CI(β) (− 0.03,
− 0.01)] decrease in 2014 when the TFR was 2.15. The corresponding measures for education are an 11% [eβ = 0.89,
β = − 0.12, 95% CI(β) (− 0.13, − 0.10)] decrease in fertility
in 2004, a 10% [eβ = 0.90, β = − 0.11, 95% CI(β) (− 0.12,
− 0.09)] decrease in 2007, a 10% [eβ = 0.90, β = − 0.11, 95%
CI(β) (− 0.12, − 0.09)] decrease in 2011 and a 9% [eβ = 0.91,
β = − 0.09, 95% CI(β) (− 0.10, − 0.08)] decrease in 2014.
Since most countries have only two waves of data, it
is difficult to determine significant variation in these estimates with much confidence, or to put forward any strong
claims about the cross-cultural variations in this patterning across time. However it does suggest that the cross-sectional between-country differences we observe above are
larger than the within-country differences over the available
time-spans.
A linear regression shows that TFR accounts for about
20% of the variation in the wealth coefficients (adjusted
R2 = 0.20), with a one unit increase in TFR associated with
about a 1% [β = 0.012, 95% CI(β) (0.01, 0.02)] increase
in the magnitude of the association (i.e., becoming more
positive in the association with fertility). Other macro-level
predictors such as GDP (measured both in US dollars and
purchasing power parity) are neither correlated with the
wealth coefficients nor account for much variance (adjusted
R2 < 0.03). We do not observe any comparable correlations
between TFR or GDP and the education coefficients (Fig. 5).

Both wealth and education affect the hypothesised
mediators of fertility in similar ways—except
for women’s work status
Figure 6 displays the structural equation model that was executed for each country, where each pathway is designated by
the proportion of countries that have either a positive (pink,
solid line), negative (blue, dashed line) or non-significant
effect (black dotted line) for the given relationship, and
where the thickness of the line indicates the proportion of
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countries where that effect was found. Each line is labelled
with the percentage of countries where a statistically significant association was found followed by a symbol to represent the direction of the association. For example, the relationship between education and contraceptive use is positive
in the majority (80%) of counties. The remaining 20% of
countries either exhibited significant negative associations
or non-significant trends. Details for each country (including
fit statistics) can be found in Table S11 in ESM.
Consistent with the multilevel models, education has a
consistent negative association with total number of live
births (significant in all 45 countries) net of controls whereas
wealth varies by country: in 55% of countries there is a significantly negative association, in 16% there is a significantly
positive association, and in the rest there is no significant
association. Both wealth and education are significantly
negatively associated with community-level child mortality
and birth rates and significantly positively associated with
contraceptive use in the vast majority of countries.
But there are some important differences. Wealth is more
consistently associated with women’s intensity of labourforce participation across countries than is education. Figure 7a displays these differences across countries. Women
in wealthier households tend to work less in over 80% of
countries. Women with more education tend to work more
in 50% of countries, but in 30% of countries they work less,
and in the remaining 20% of countries, education is not significantly associated with women’s work status (see Fig. 7b).
This pattern seems to be driven by differences between high
and low fertility countries. Among the subset of relatively
lower-fertility countries (those with TFRs ≤ 3), education
is positively associated with intensiveness of labour-force
participation (or has no effect in India). In higher-fertility
countries (particularly those with TFRs > 4.5), the association between education and labour market participation is
highly variable: more countries exhibit a negative association between education and women’s work status than a positive one.

Contraceptive use and local birth rates,
but not mortality or work status, have independent
associations with fertility in the majority
of countries
Both contraceptive use and community-level birth rate are
significantly positively associated with fertility in more than
95% of countries surveyed. This pattern for contraceptive
use is in line with much research in sub-Saharan Africa
showing that women who have many children are often more
likely to adopt contraceptives, but it is surprising to see that
this association is also widespread outside of this region.
On the other hand, community-level child mortality rate
appears to have little direct effect on the number of children

Population Ecology (2018) 60:155–169
Fig. 5  Beta coefficients (± SE)
of a wealth and b education
on fertility for all 85 waves in
the 36 countries. Coefficients
are colour-coded by country, with survey years indicated
by the adjacent numbers. Note
again that the sign of the beta
coefficients for wealth spans
both positive and negative
values (a), whereas the corresponding beta coefficients
for education (b) are always
negative
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being born (as opposed to the number of children remaining alive) despite being widely hypothesised to influence
fertility outcomes. While in 100% of surveys, there is a
significant negative relationship between community-level
mortality and number of living children (see Table S12 in
ESM), in 75% of countries there is no association between
community-level child mortality and number of live births.
The remaining 25% of countries are split between significant
positive or negative associations (Fig. 8a). For instance, Mali
had an estimated under-5 mortality rate of 11.5% in 2016
(World Bank 2017), but community-level child mortality
was not associated with the number of live births in our
analysis. This seemingly paradoxical result suggests that

mortality rates (at least as we have operationalized them
here, see “Methods”) have little direct impact on actual
birth rates across less-developed countries, though they are
of course strongly associated with the number of children
that survive.
Also surprising was the finding that in 45% of countries,
women’s work had no association with fertility. Where there
is a significant association it tends to be negative (39% of
countries). Again we see a difference between low and
high fertility regimes: in countries with low TFRs, working
women tend to have fewer live births, while in countries with
higher TFRs, women’s work status has no association with
their fertility (see Fig. 8b).
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Within‑country surveys show some pathways
change consistently through time

Fig. 6  The structural equation model (SEM) that was executed for
each country, where each pathway represents the proportion of countries that have either a positive (pink, solid line), negative (blue,
dashed line) or non-significant effect (black dotted line) for the given
relationship, and where the thickness of the line indicates the proportion of countries where that effect was found (note that only the most
frequent effect is indicated)

a

Fig. 7  The structural equation model (see Fig. 6) standardised effect
size of a wealth and b education on women’s work by country. Countries are ordered from lowest TFR (at the top) to highest TFR (at the
bottom). ES represents “Effect size” with 95% confidence intervals.
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There are 12 countries where surveys were collected three
(or more) times over approximately 10 years (refer to
Table S2 in ESM for details). This allows us to determine if
and how the paths change over time. The full results of these
path analyses can be found in Table S13 in ESM. One of the
most consistent changes is the path between age and number of births. Not surprisingly, as fertility is reduced (which
is occurring in every country included in our survey), the
effect size of age on number of births shrinks (see Fig. 9).
The magnitude of the association between these variables
is decreasing over time. The opposite is true for education.
As women have fewer children the magnitude of the negative association between women’s education and number of
births gets larger. This is happening in 75% of the countries
we analysed.
The paths between both wealth and education and contraceptive use are generally positive (see Fig. 6). Wealthier and more highly educated individuals are more likely
to use contraceptives, but the size of the effect tends to be
reduced across time in 7 of 12 countries we examined, possibly reflecting the diffusion of contraceptive practices over
b

The area of the grey box is proportional to the weight of the country
in determining the overall effect, which is represented by the diamond
and dashed vertical line. The solid vertical line represents the null
effect (effect = 0)

Population Ecology (2018) 60:155–169

165

a

b

Fig. 8  The structural equation model (see Fig. 6) standardised effect
of a community-level children’s mortality and b women’s work on
number of live births by country. Countries are ordered from lowest
TFR (at the top) to the highest TFR (at the bottom). ES represents

“Effect size” with 95% confidence intervals. The area of the grey box
is proportional to the weight of the country in determining the overall
effect, which is represented by the diamond and dashed vertical line.
The solid vertical line represents the null effect (effect = 0)

time (see Fig. 9). Again, the size of the association between
education and women’s labour force participation tends to
increase with time. This suggests that as fertility declines,
more educated women are more likely to participate in the
labour force, mirroring our earlier results. We do not observe
any consistent change in the association between women’s
labour force participation and number of births across the
10-year period covered by the data in most (9) of the countries. This contrasts with the cross-country pattern, where
negative associations between labour-force participation and
number of births tend to emerge in low fertility contexts.

u

Fig. 9  The structural equation model (SEM) that was executed for
countries that have three or more waves of data collection (n = 12; for
full results, see Table S13 in ESM). Each pathway represents the proportion of countries (out of twelve) that have an increasing effect size
over time (green line), a decreasing effect size over time (red line) or
inconsistent effect/no change in effect over time (black dotted line) for
the given association. It is also indicated (in parentheses) whether the
association is becoming more negative, less negative, more positive,
or less positive if that effect is consistent. (Note that only the most
frequent effect is indicated)

Discussion
It seems obvious that the predictors and mediators of fertility decline will vary in direction and relative magnitude,
according to population-level variation, but there is currently
a lack of multivariate cross-cultural comparison in different
economic and ecological settings to demonstrate this. Our
results demonstrate that women’s education and wealth are
both important predictors of fertility, but when examined
separately, it is clear that they have differing effects on fertility and interact with each other. Across all 45 countries
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analysed, a negative association between education and fertility is evident after controlling for other variables, including wealth. But the association between wealth and fertility
is much more variable: it is positive in many high-fertility
countries, but negative in many low-fertility countries. Given
that education and wealth are usually at least somewhat positively correlated, the positive effects of wealth on fertility
may only be observeable when the effect of education is
controlled for. Historical and non-European fertility declines
indicate that the characterisation of rich families reducing
their fertility first in a demographic transition may not be
completely accurate (Borgerhoff Mulder 1998; Dribe and
Scalone 2014). Taking into account the multidimensionality of wealth and status may help to address these questions
more fully in the future.
Skirbekk (2008) documented a switch in status-fertility
differentials over time. Based on our models and using more
directly comparable data across 45 countries, it appears that
the positive association between wealth and fertility switches
when countries fall below approximately six births/women.
Nonetheless, all of the countries we analysed were experiencing some level of incipient fertility decline at the time
of interview.
Moreover, education and wealth interact. Our analyses
suggest that this interaction is relatively robust across countries (we did not find that the slope of the interaction varied substantially, result not shown) and shows that among
women with the highest levels of education, more wealth is
typically translated into fewer children. The opposite is the
case for women with the lowest levels of education: more
wealth is typically translated into more children. This replicates a similar finding at the community level in our previous work. It also suggests that demographic transitions can
be conceptualised as transitions in the nature and effects of
wealth and status (Kaplan 1996; Borgerhoff Mulder et al.
2009; Colleran et al. 2015; Stulp and Barrett 2016).
We examined whether the effects of wealth and education
on fertility differed over time within 36 countries for which
there were repeated waves of data collection. While there
does appear to be some change over time, it is neither substantial nor consistent across countries. Differences between
countries seem to be larger than differences between waves
of data collected within countries. Ultimately, with only
two time points in most countries the data are insufficient
to fully explore this question. Longitudinal data, analysed
on a per-country basis, will undoubtedly shed more light.
Nonetheless, we can show that the effects of wealth on fertility co-vary with the country-level TFR, but this is not the
case for education.
Our structural equation models demonstrate that the way
women’s education and wealth influence the number of children born depends partly on both community-level birth
rates and contraceptive use, but not on community-level
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mortality and women’s work status. Women’s education and
wealth increase the likelihood of contraceptive use, which in
turn has a positive association with number of births; those
using contraceptives have on average, more children. While
seemingly counter-intuitive, this effect is well known in subSaharan Africa (Caldwell and Caldwell 1987; Bledsoe et al.
1994; Mace and Colleran 2009; Alvergne et al. 2013), where
those women who adopt contraceptives are regularly the
ones who already have many children and want to space or
limit future births and where cultures of high fertility remain
strong (Caldwell and Caldwell 1987; Bledsoe et al. 1994;
Mbacké 2017). Community-level birth rates likely provide
social information about reproductive decisions, and people may adopt the reproductive strategies of others living in
their community, as we and others have previously found at
lower levels of aggregation (Kravdal 2012; Colleran et al.
2014). Since community level data capture the local social
and economic environments that characterise women’s daily
lives, the characteristics of neighbours and friends may have
a larger effect on fertility decline than the same characteristics at higher levels of aggregation (Kravdal 2012). There
may also be some selection effect here, as women with more
education or household wealth are probably less likely to
live in high fertility areas.
In 75% of countries analysed, community-level mortality had no discernible association with births despite the
very large sample sizes (over 800,000 women). While some
have hypothesised that high mortality rates may have larger
effects on fertility in high-mortality contexts (Snopkowski
et al. 2016), we do not observe this pattern in our results.
It is possible that the type of mortality is very important.
When mortality is extrinsic (or unpreventable), individuals may respond by having additional children, but when
mortality is intrinsic and can be avoided by particular investment strategies, we may predict increased investment and/
or fertility as a response to mortality. Unfortunately, even
with detailed information at the community-level, it is hard
to determine exactly how much mortality is extrinsic versus
intrinsic. Future research should explore whether type of
mortality (or specific causes of mortality) can help explain
fertility decisions. It is also possible that our measure of
community-level mortality rate is too coarse since it is only
based on the women who were surveyed in a given cluster.
Small variations in local mortality rates may require very
large samples to be accurately detectable.
Women’s labour-force participation is widely thought to
be an important mediator of the relationship between women’s education and fertility (Becker 1981; Ermisch 1989;
Snopkowski and Kaplan 2014; Snopkowski et al. 2016).
But greater education increases the intensity of labour-force
participation in only 50% of the countries surveyed, mainly
in low fertility contexts. Nonetheless, education appears to
have an increasingly important association with women’s
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labour-force participation through time. Conversely, women
in wealthier households tend to work less, not more, in 83%
of countries. Women’s work status was the only mediator that had qualitatively different mediating associations
between wealth/education and fertility.
Women’s work status is a poor predictor of total number of births, but appears more important in low-fertility
contexts. The association between women’s labour-force
participation and number of live births is not consistently
changing across time.
By explicitly examining cross-cultural variation in both
the overall relationships between key predictors of fertility
decline and the path-dependence of their effects, we highlight that the causal structure of fertility decline will differ
under varying ecological, cultural and economic scenarios.
This has broad implications for our understanding of the
kinds of evolutionary trajectories that drive demographic
change over time and especially highlights that the processes
themselves may differ depending on the context and the level
of analysis. The prevailing cultural and economic institutions in different countries will variably influence the way
that education and wealth provide access to opportunities
and information for women, making it more or less advantageous to calibrate reproductive strategies to local community
dynamics instead of macro level ones. For example, gender
norms directly or indirectly restricting women’s employment can work against macro-level selective pressures for
market-oriented skills and investment in embodied capital.
Cross-cultural differences in ‘tightness’ and ‘looseness’—for
example, how acceptable deviations from existing norms are,
how new norms are received and how open the mass media
and information flows are—could influence cultural transmission dynamics both within and between countries (Gelfand et al. 2011). Structural biases in development spending,
driven by macro-level interactions in international networks,
could cause some areas to more slowly adapt to changing
reproductive incentives at the macro-level, or enable them
to maintain reproductive strategies that are equilibrated to
the local economy.
There has been considerable debate about whether different predictors of fertility decline represent underlying
‘economic’ or ‘cultural’ influences on reproduction. Knowing more about the inter-correlations between different
predictors, and in particular how those inter-correlations
themselves vary across cultures, should help researchers
develop a better understanding of the causal structure of
fertility decline that avoids simply prioritising one key variable. One of the strengths of this research is that we are able
to cross-culturally compare different predictors of fertility, which provides us with macro-level information about
the amount of variation in key predictors and mediators of
fertility decline. Along with this strength comes the disadvantages associated with large-scale demographic datasets
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that involve secondary data analysis, including that the
survey was not collected to answer our specific question,
that there may be non-response bias associated with such a
time-intensive survey, and differences in the sampling criteria across countries, for instance, by excluding particular
groups of women based on marital status (Stulp et al. 2016).
Additionally, there are many additional structural features of
these countries that could be built into our models, including
ethnic, linguistic and religious sub-groupings, region and
sub-region, which may have important influences on fertility
behaviour. We ignore these effects for the moment, overlooking the cultural and structured complexity of fertility decline
within each country in favour of a broader assessment of
the variation between countries. This is because the number
and types of such structuring properties vary substantially
by country and allowing the slopes of wealth and education
to vary within each of these structures would currently present insurmountable difficulties, both computationally and
in terms of interpreting the resulting variation in a crosscultural light. While we are aware that the relationships we
report here may vary at lower levels of aggregation (Kravdal
2012; Colleran et al. 2015), these may be better assessed on
a country-by-country basis that takes this complexity more
fully into account. Future research will surely examine these
important aspects in more detail and this study is a first step
towards quantifying these differences cross-culturally.
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